

STATINTL

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

The Senate, as an institution, settled all questions as to its continuing status when it adapted rule XXXII. The proponents of majority cloture will have to accept the existence of this and all other rules of the Senate if they will accept any portion of the rules. It is impossible for them to point to selective parts of the Senate rules and say, "Those we will accept, but to these others we deny any essence of validity." I believe that by their very actions they have evidenced their belief in the continuing nature of the Senate and in the fact that the Senate rules do carry over from session to session, thereby guaranteeing orderly procedure.

This is a proposition not unlike that which would arise if an individual, upon being appointed or elected to an important position, decided to accept the perquisites of the office but to reject the attendant responsibilities. This cannot be done. Mr. President, as all Members of the Senate will know, the opponents of free debate cannot establish their own rules and expect undeviating adherence to them by the Members of this body. By attempting to do so they cast a reflection upon themselves and upon the Senate. The ground rules of this encounter are already well established and it is imperative that they be strictly adhered to, not just in part, but in toto.

If the Senate were not operating under rules at the present time, the confusion which would exist is beyond the imagination of ordinary men. The emergencies of the country, both domestic and foreign, would have to run their course while we of the Senate wrangled in an attempt to extricate ourselves from a self-made maelstrom of parliamentary confusion.

Not would that be the end. Should we so abandon order for confusion, a precedent would be set for future Congresses, many of which would then want to assert their independence and draft their own rules. Each group could flex its muscles and determine its gain or loss of strength among new Members. It is conceivable to me that eventually the first year of each session would have to be set aside for the Senate to make its rules under which to act on substantive matters during the second year of the session. It may be said that this is the wildest sort of speculation—and it is. That is the point. We are asked to sacrifice the traditionally orderly procedure of the Senate for something as to the nature of which we can only speculate; and I may add that the only guide that is offered to limit our speculation is our individual imagination.

I sincerely hope and trust that the Senate has not degenerated to the point at which it will, at one grand sweep, shatter the cornerstone of its existence. It deserves a better fate than strangulation in a parliamentary jungle of its own making.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be suspended.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. The clerk will continue to call the roll.

The legislative clerk resumed the call of the roll.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be suspended.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield 6 minutes of my time to the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], without its counting as a speech against him, in order that he may make a brief statement on another subject.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I am very glad to give my concurrence to that request of the Senator from Louisiana.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### EUROPEAN UNITY AND ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, as a result of recent actions by the French Government, the trend toward free world unity has suffered a severe setback. By his imperious disruption of the negotiations in Brussels for British admission to the Common Market, as well as by his rejection of proposals for a unified Western defense effort, General de Gaulle has made it clear that he is more interested in unattainable French ambitions than in a realistic program for the security and prosperity of the West. It is indeed puzzling that a leader who solved his country's colonial problems with the vision and realism of a Clemenceau should now try to shape the future of Europe with the romantic illusions of a Napoleon.

The great lesson of two World Wars and the postwar struggle with communism is that no free nation can hope to realize its own national ambitions in utter disregard of friends and allies. This is true for the United States, and it is certainly true for France. But General de Gaulle apparently does not think so. He appears to have persuaded himself that if he remains intransigent and uncooperative on matters that vitally affect France's partners, America will reward him with gifts of nuclear weapons, Britain will depart obligingly from the European scene, and the Common Market countries will submit tamely to French leadership. I am reminded of the saying of an old Arkansas farmer: "It's better to be ignorant than to know what ain't so."

The question underlying the present crisis is whether the free West is to unite its immense resources in an Atlantic partnership for the defense of freedom or to be divided against itself by the revival of worriment national ambitions. The Communists have tried and failed

repeatedly over the past 17 years to shatter the Western alliance. It would be a tragedy of incalculable proportions if the great hopes and opportunities of a unified West were to be lost, not as a result of Communist efforts, but as a result of shortsighted and unrealistic ambitions within the Western community. Reluctantly but irrevocably, America in the last generation has abandoned its traditional isolation, recognizing that in the nuclear age even so powerful a nation as the United States can be neither secure nor prosperous in isolation. It would be ironic indeed if the United States were to be driven back into isolation by the revival of a narrow nationalism in Europe.

An American observer can only be perplexed by General de Gaulle's distrust and contempt for Great Britain and the United States. Since the end of World War II the United States has provided generous economic assistance and powerful political support for the revival and unification of Western Europe. It is not necessary to remind our European partners that without the Marshall plan and the NATO alliance they would almost certainly have fallen under Soviet domination. Since Europe has recovered its economic strength the United States has encouraged every step toward European unity—the Coal and Steel Community, the European Defense Community—which was conceived and then rejected by France—and finally the formation of the Economic Community under the Treaty of Rome. In addition, the United States bore, and continues to bear, a disproportionate share of the common defense burden, not only in nuclear weapons but in foot soldiers and conventional weapons as well.

In the light of these facts, it is beyond my understanding that General de Gaulle can profess to believe that the United States and Britain cannot be trusted to meet their obligation for the defense of Europe, that, indeed, the United States may some day unite with the Soviet Union against Europe. Again and again we have proven that our commitment to free Europe is absolute and irrevocable as long as Europe adheres to its own commitment. If General de Gaulle does not believe our assurances, it is because he chooses to disbelieve them.

The truly perplexing question is why. In the absence of any rational basis for General de Gaulle's distrust of the Anglo Saxons, as he calls us, one can only look to some of the peculiar traits of the French nation. France has often had a special susceptibility for grand, romantic causes and has pursued them at times with more regard for their grandeur than for their attainability. One recalls the liberation of France by Joan of Arc, the heroic but losing wars of Louis XIV, the vast ambitions of Napoleon I and the petty ambitions of Napoleon III, the heroic struggle in World War I and the collapse in World War II, and finally the foredoomed colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria.